<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On 28 March 2011 the\nEU Commission presented the white paper \u201cRoadmap to a Single\nEuropean Transport Area \u2013 Towards a competitive and resource\nefficient transport system\u201c. Even the title of this new white paper\nclearly shows the inconsistency of the project in two different ways:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These\ninconsistencies in the title themselves are no coincidence. In this\nrespect it could be said that the title is somewhat honest and by all\nmeans programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The new EU white\npaper did not arouse any enthusiasm but it certainly received praise.\nIn a comment made by the European Traffic Union (EVG) it states that\n\u201eThe white paper contains a number of good approaches which could\nstrengthen the international competition for the railway.\u201d And:\n\u201cThe goals (in this white paper; W.W.) are not new. However, the\ngood thing is that they are now defined as official objectives at the\nhighest level.\u201d \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I also reached other\nconclusions. The targets presented in this white paper have been\npresented by the EU for over one and a half decades \u2013 always at the\nhighest level. It is also exactly these approaches for the EU policy\non transport which have been weakening the railways for some time and\nwhich will increase damage to the railway in the near future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before I go into any\ndetails I would like to say something about the character of the EU\nwhite papers and at the same time categorise the new EU white paper\ninto the collection of EU white Papers on the subject of transport. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On a national level\nthere are different levels of wording and determining politics. There\nare ceremonial speeches on the \u201cstate of the nation\u201d. These are\nextremely unbinding speeches with a lot of lyrics. There are also\ngovernment explanations and coalition agreements. These are\nstatements on politics \u2013 but still only declarations\nof intent<\/em>. They are followed by laws,\nregulations and resolutions on the budget which are mainly specific\nand tangible politics for citizens \u2013 especially when they concern\nincome, expenditures, loans and taxes. It is not seldom that the\nspecific politics tangible for the local people are in grave contrast\nto the succession of explanations on general politics. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Two examples: in the\ngovernment declarations of the red-green coalition elected in 1998\nand 2002 there was a lot of talk about social responsibility, social\ncompensation, peace policy and \u201cintegrated transport policy\u201d. In\nreality the laws on the benefits system (symbolised by the so-called\nHartz IV laws) were passed during the Schr\u00f6der-Fischer era, the\nfirst war with German participation since the end of World War II was\nled in Kosovo and privatisation of the railway was pursued. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The programme with\nwhich the PASOK was elected as the new leading government party at\nthe end of 2009 and with which the conservative government led by\nKaramanlis was dissolved expressly gave its support to social\nequilibrium and to the fact that the crisis beginning in Greece\nshould not be allowed to be resolved at the expense of the\npopulation. The actual politics practised under Papandreou and under\nPapademos since the end of 2011 (which by the way were strongly\ndetermined by the EU and the IMF) within two years led to twice the\nnumber of unemployed and three times the number of those people\nliving below the poverty line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At an EU level there\nare comparably different levels of statements on politics. There are\ngeneral \u2013 and largely non-committal \u2013 statements by the\nCommission and the President of the Commission. There are white\npapers which likewise demonstrate a relatively low degree of\nconcretisation. There are thus the \u201cRailway Packages\u201d and the\nspecific EU guidelines and regulations which, when implemented at a\nnational level, are then enforced by law. Finally, there are EU\nprogrammes and financial resolutions, for example in the case of the\ntransport sector the TEN programmes on the one hand and support of\nair transport through a lack of kerosene tax and promotion of\nregional airports on the other, which considerably define the\nspecific policies on transport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This does not mean\nthat white papers are uninteresting and could be put to one side. The\nanalysis of these texts is worthwhile \u2013 and yet we have to leave\nout the lyrics and place these white papers and similarly interesting\ngreen papers 2<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\non the subject of transport in a larger context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 1992 the EU\ncommission has published two green papers on transport (1992 and\n1995) and three white papers on transport (1992, 2001 and 2011). The\nnew white paper is therefore the fifth \u201ccoloured paper\u201d on this\ntopic. Purely mathematically, there was a suchlike basic declaration\non the EU policy on transport every four years. The new white paper\nis, however, the first publication of this kind in one decade. In my\nopinion, this also leads us to become \u201cblinded\u201d by it and thus\nthe present commissioner on transport, Siim Kallas, presented this\nwhite paper along the lines of \u201cnow it\u2019s my turn\u201d. At this\npoint, and against the backdrop that I have read and compared all\nwhite papers and green papers, I maintain that everything stated in\nthe new white paper has been said before and everything was worded\nbetter (more precise, clearer, more environment friendly).3<\/sup><\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Taking into account\nthose aspects which are of significance for the unions in rail\nengineering and railways and those in environmental associations I\nhave discovered six decisive items or\nweb errors<\/strong><\/em> which appear in all\nwhite and green papers and which focus on the wrong aspects from the\npoint of view of transport and welfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Firstly.<\/strong><\/em>All green and white papers contain the\ndogma \u201cgrowth, growth above anything else\u201d. Growth in transport\nis particularly honoured and presented as a part of the increasing\nstandard of living or as a contribution to a higher quality of life.\nIn this type of transport there are no crises; the link between\ngrowth in transport and the environmental impact is ignored. The view\nthat human happiness and quality of life would increase to the same\ndegree as the number of kilometres a person travels and per\ntonne-kilometre is simply ridiculous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Secondly.<\/strong>\nThe green and white papers are based on an inefficiency of the\npresent infrastructure. A demand is made for more transport networks\nwhich are often referred to as \u201cclosing the gaps\u201d and the\n\u201celimination of bottlenecks\u201c. This is not often openly stated but\nunderstood as: what have to be expanded are roads, airports and\npossibly water routes and ports. I will talk about the systematic\ndecrease in railways in parallel later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thirdly. <\/strong><\/em>The\nissue of \u201cexternal costs\u201d, which is so important for the policy\non transport, emerges. However, on the one hand increasingly in a\nwatered down form and on the other without any consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What this means is: \nin the form of burdens and damages in the field of health, the\nenvironment, climate, overlaps of landscapes and cities, etc.\ntransport causes enormous costs which are not included in the\ntransport prices. This issue has been known for more than two decades\nand the white and green papers address this problem. A study carried\nout on EU level on behalf of the International Association of\nRailways (UIC \u2013 Union International des Chemins de Fer) discovered\nas early as 2000 that these costs not contained in the transport\nprices at that point in time were around 650 Euros bn. This was well\nseven percent of the gross domestic product of the EU at that time \u2026\nand meant that over 90 percent of these external transport costs were\ncaused by road and air transport.4<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\nThe logic of market economy states that those costs not contained in\nthe market offers have to be integrated (or \u201cinternalised\u201d) into\nthe market prices, and that this would result in a kind of justified\nmarket regulation on the basis of which consumers and investors would\nmake the \u201ccorrect\u201d decision. This theory certainly has its\npitfalls \u2013 what, for example, is a \u201cjustified price\u201d for a\nperson killed in a traffic accident (or for maintaining a human\nlife)? How much compensation should a person receive who becomes\npsychologically ill as a result of aircraft noise? How much for that\nperson who becomes crippled as a result of a road traffic accident\nand is bound to a wheelchair? The aforementioned study states that\nsums of money from this specific transport organisation have been set\naside for results like these. In actual fact the approximately 40,000\npersons killed in traffic accidents within the EU each year or those\n100,000 persons who become crippled as a result of road traffic\naccidents should be included in one way or another in the overall\nbalance. At this point I would like to briefly address the\nproblematic of this approach of mere market economy and not go into\nfurther detail. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is about the\nfundamentals: the issue of external costs emerges in all those green\nand white papers mentioned but this is watered down increasingly from\nbook to book. In the actual policy on transport there is not only no\napproach at all to internalising these costs, in actual fact it is\nquite the contrary \u2013 there is a continued scissor-like diverging\ndevelopment of the actual transport costs \u2013 the costs in road\ntransport and air transport sometimes actually drop relatively in\ncomparison to the costs of rail and other public ground transport.\nPlease refer to the following section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is decisive\nhere is that in this manner and as a result of this kind of \u201cfalse\nmarket signals\u201c a problematic transport regulation ensues, leading\nto the \u201cwrong transport\u201c, which has to virtually be consolidated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourthly.<\/strong><\/em>Railway and rail transport appear in\nthe green and white papers \u2013 if at all \u2013 almost only as\nhigh-speed transport (and in this case often as part of the TEN\nprojects5<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>).\nThis means that the focus is on long-distance transport, although\nthis only covers about 10 percent of all transport services \u2013 and\nat the most 25 percent of transport services in the railway sector.\nThis means, however, that the decisive mass transport in the railway\nsector is simply not included in these basic documents of the EU.\nRather, the image of transport, as it appears here, correlates to the\nspecific transport needs of the Eurocrats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifthly.<\/strong><\/em>\nThe green and white papers mentioned are characterised by a market\nand competition ethos. I already indicated that this type of\norientation is a problem in general; you cannot respond to the major\nissues we are dealing with here by merely implementing measures used\nin market economy. In addition to the aspect of persons killed and\ninjured in traffic accidents, let us approach the issue of climatic\nchange. In this instance too there is an attempt to merely react with\nmeasures used in market economy, for example with emission trading. \nIn actual fact, however, emissions cause the greenhouse gases to\nincrease significantly which, if not stopped, will have catastrophic\nconsequences. Obviously a meaningful policy on climate will primarily\nhave to be based on specific politics on a major scale, i.e. also on\nbans, specific restrictions, measures, etc. I will explain this in\nmore detail using the current white paper on transport 2011 as an\nexample.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Generally speaking,\nthis fifth web error can be found in the EU documents in the demand\nfor an \u201copening of the transport markets\u201d after a \u201cfree access\nto the rail network\u201c and above all in the demand for a separation\nof network and operation. (See paragraph 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sixthly.<\/strong><\/em>\nThe EU basic books on the topic of transport developed the postulate\nof a type of new human rights , the \u201cright to mobility\u201c, whereby\nthis mainly concerns the growth of the increased number of kilometres\ntravelled by passengers within the practice of mobility. This is\nclosely connected to the first web error mentioned on the EU green\nand white papers \u2013 the dogma on continued growth. This belief was\neven documented in the EU white paper on transport in 2001: \u201cThere\nis a basic right to mobility. This and the increase in mobility is\nregarded by EU citizens as an acquis and even claimed as a right.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new EU white\npaper is by far the thinnest in its quantitative and qualitative\nform. The 35 loosely described pages of the actual document are only\none third of the 2001 white paper. This corresponds to the contents\nwhich are almost all kept in a general manner, where hardly one\nprecise statement can be found with which the white paper now or in\nthe future could withstand a usability test. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Two comparisons<\/em>.\nThe 2001 white paper still contained the specific value according to\nwhich the \u201cmarket value of the rails in goods transport until 2020\nshould be increased from eight to 15 percent\u201c. This was ambitious\nand precise and would have corresponded to about four times the\namount of transportation efficiency on the railway in absolute\nfigures. The new white paper does not even mention this target. The\nreason why is clear: during the past decade the number of rails in\ngoods transport could not increase and now this white paper the\ntarget is worded as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c30 percent of the\nroad goods transport over 300 km (distance; W.W.) should be\ntransferred to other transport vehicles such as rail and ship\ntransport by 2030 (the latter means coastal shipping; W.W.); more\nthan 50 percent by 2050.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n At this point there\nis no link to the current situation: how much percentage of the\ncurrent EU-wide road goods transport with over 300 km distance, if\nyou please, is presently transported by trucks? How many of them are\nthen \u201c30 percent\u201d, respectively \u201c50 percent\u201d? This target\nsays even in an inverse conclusion that goods transport with\ndistances shorter than 300 km is excluded from this transfer option.\nIf you ask yourself the question of how many truck transportations\noperate at a distance of over 300 km, the German transportation\nstatistics provides you with the following sobering answers: the\naverage distance of transportation in German goods transport was only\n100 km in 2009 (whereby it was still only 84 km in 2000). There is\ninternational truck transport of course, which is not exactly\nunimportant (in German statistics this is stated as being truck\ntransport with foreign trucks), and which generally speaking has a\nconsiderably higher distance of transportation. However, as a kind of\ncounterweight there is still the truck transport from the plants and\nfactories, this is truck transportation by those companies which\ntransport their own goods and produce with their own trucks. This\ntruck transport from the plants is not included in the aforementioned\n\u201ccommercial truck transport\u201c; it covers significantly lesser\ndistances. In the overall balance it could be that the average\ntransportation distance for the entire truck transport in Germany is\nin actual fact around 100 km. The corresponding rate for the entire\ntruck transport in the EU is probably similar because Germany is a\nlarge country and a lot of the truck transport to the smaller\ncountries \u2013 and all the more truck transport to the UK and Ireland\n\u2013 has a considerably shorter average transportation rate. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n In total this means\nthat truck transportations covering a distance of over 300 km\nrepresent an extraordinarily small portion of the market. The\nobjective of the white paper to convert these means of transportation\nto a third over a period of 20 years cannot be taken seriously; the\nwording of the white paper is a bluff. This lack of seriousness,\nwhich can also be noted in many sections of the white paper, also\nthrows a significant light on the entire character of the document.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another example: the\n2001 white paper contained impressive graphics on the diverging\ndevelopment of the rail and road infrastructure: the road network\nwithin the EU becomes longer from year to year while the rail network\nis cut. On this issue the transport commissioner at that time, Loyola\nde Palacio, bravely stated, \u201cthat on an average over the past\nthirty years 600 rail kilometres disappear each year but 1200\nmotorway kilometres are newly constructed.\u201d \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2011 white paper\nremains silent on this issue, why? Because it is exactly this trend\nwhich, as stated in the white paper ten years ago was not allowed to\ncontinue, is continuing in the same manner. Further details are given\nbelow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The basic philosophy\nof the new white paper is stated by the EU commissioner Siim Kallas\nas follows: \u201cthe future well-being of our continent will depend on\nall regions being able to maintain their extensive and\ncompetition-oriented integration into the world economy. Efficient\ntransport is a basic prerequisite for this.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The white paper on\ntransport which mainly covers 2010 but which was not made available\nuntil the end of March 2011 was not able to document the new deep\ncrisis of the EU, in particular the new Euro and financial crisis in\nits entirety. However, against the backdrop of this crisis it can be\nnoted that \u201cintegration into the world economy\u201c – in short\nglobalisation \u2013 is one of the causes of the deep structural crisis\nwe have observed in the EU peripheral countries since the end of 2010\nand which is spreading to the core EU. It may well be that this\ncrisis will exacerbate once more and we will experience a new general\ncrisis as a combination of a financial, bank and Euro crisis in 2012\nwhich will exceed the one from 2008\/2009 and one which will again be\none of the results of the \u201cintegration\u201d of unprepared and\neconomically weak countries within the EU and the world economy. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n With this in the\nbackground the EU white paper on transport once more demonstrates\nthat it is naive and ideological.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the following\nparagraphs I will specify the aforementioned six web errors for the\nnew white paper which have characterised the EU white and green\npapers for more than two decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new white paper\ndemands that \u201cgrowth in transport be guaranteed\u201c. Kallas\npostulates, \u201cThe widespread assumption that mobility has to be\nrestricted in order to combat the climate change is simply not true.\u201d\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The man is simply\nmaking it very easy on himself. In actual fact, 25 percent of all\ngreenhouse gases within the EU which are responsible for the climatic\nchange are the result of the transport sector, 90 percent of which\nare from road and air transport. Within the EU the transport sector\nis the only economic sector in which CO2<\/sub>\nemissions continue to increase. They even increase so quickly that\nthey compensate for all decreases which were and will be in all other\nEU economic sectors. The much quoted savings in emissions from\nprivate vehicles, trucks and aircraft are by far offset by the\ngeneral increase in transport from private vehicles, trucks and\naircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This means that the\nsignificant and rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in road\nand air transport should be top priority on the agenda of a\nresponsible policy on transport. This can only be realised by\nimplementing a policy on transport which also<\/em>\nincorporates a significant reduction in those transport services\nprovided. The fact that \u201cmobility\u201c does not have to be restricted\nas a result of this is a different matter. What is absolutely absurd\nand extremely irresponsible in view of the looming climate\ncatastrophe is the demand made by the white paper that \u201can INCREASE\nin transport\u201d has to be guaranteed. This effectively advocates a\npolicy on transport which has to contribute towards a continued\nincrease in the climate change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new white paper\nstates that \u201ccongestion is a major concern in the EU transport\nsector\u201c. This \u201ccompromises accessibility\u201c. In a manner typical\nfor this document it also states abruptly and without further\nevidence as to how this claim ensued: \u201cCongestion costs will\nincrease by about 50% by 2050.\u201d Increase on what basis? How high\nare these \u201ccosts caused by congestion\u201c today? How are they\ncalculated? \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n After all: which\ninfrastructures are \u201ccongested\u201c? Those who are familiar with this\nissue realise that, above all, Kallas distinguishes from the\nso-called \u201ccongestion costs\u201d at this point. However, leading\ntransport experts rightfully dispute the fact that these type of\n\u201ccosts\u201c are of any relevance; in particular, they should not be\nallowed to be elevated to the level of external costs.6<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\n \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n An interesting fact\nis that congestion costs are only mentioned in connection with\nautomobile traffic (private vehicles and trucks) \u2013 while the\nmotorway network is constantly undergoing expansion. At the same time\n\u2013 definitely due to the system – there are no traffic jams and\ncongestion costs in rail transport, whereby the railway network is\nconstantly being reduced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This allows us to\nperform a specific comparison between the 2011 white paper and the\n2001 white paper on this issue. The motorway network within the 27 EU\ncountries had a scale of 54,700 km in 2000; in 2007 it reached\n65,100; in 2012 it will probably exceed 70,000 km. Within the same\nperiod of time the rail network within the territory of the 27 EU\nmember states was decreased from 217,349 212,842 km (in 2008). On an\nannual level (for those periods with exact figures) this results in a\ndecrease of the rail network at a rate of 563 km per year and an\nincrease of the motorway network at a rate of 1306 km per year? What\nrelation again did Commissioner Loyola de Palacio state in 2001? A\n600 km decrease in the rail network and a 1200 km increase in the\nmotorway network \u2026 as \u201cdevelopment which must not be allowed to\ncontinue\u201c. We have now experienced another decade in which this\ndiverging development continued year by year with exactly the same\nnumber of kilometres, this is eerie and almost like planned economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transport\ninitiatives created the following saying: \u201cthose who sow the seeds\nfor roads will harvest road transport\u201d. This is exactly what is\ntaking place in the EU (and worldwide). In a sense you could also say\nthat the EU is also allowing \u201cpre-concreting\u201d to take place: the\nmotorway network is being expanded faster than the increase in car\ntraffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This topic is\nlargely excluded from the white paper on transport and then, when it\nis addressed, it is played down. This is in direct contrast to the\ngreen and white papers published in 1992 and 1995. Siim Kallas argues\nin the white paper: \u201cWe can break the transport system\u2019s\ndependence on oil without sacrificing its efficiency and compromising\nmobility and thus resulting in advantages all-around.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is utter\nnonsense; dependence on oil in the transport sector in particular is\ngreater than ever before. Agro fuels and electric cars play a lesser\nrole and are linked with systemic issues. From a purely technical\npoint of view it is not conceivable that these so-called alternatives\nto oil dependency will play a major role in the future. Even the\nofficial and much too optimistic plans of the EU or the governments\nin Berlin and Paris for electric cars provide for only a portion of\nless than 5 percent within the entire fleet of vehicles and less than\n3 percent within transport services up until 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The white paper\nlargely ignores the demand for an internalisation of external costs\nto the actual transport costs which has been on the agenda for more\nthan two decades. Instead, it states: \u201cThe Commission will develop\nguidelines for the application of internalisation charges \u2026\u201d by\nthe way: for at least 15 years recognised studies have been carried\nout on the amount of external costs in transport and the demand to\nintegrate them. However, the 2011 white paper wishes to first develop\n\u201cguidelines\u201c, which is a pure expression of inaction and a\ncontinuation of playing for time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In air transport the\nissue of external costs is particularly obvious; the CO2<\/sub>\nemissions from air transport are regarded as particularly critical\nbecause they mainly occur at great altitudes and damage the\nenvironment significantly more than emissions close to the ground. In\nspite of this, kerosene is not even subjected to mineral oil tax. The\nnumerous references within national debates on the environment which\nstate that one single<\/em>\ncountry can hardly start kerosene taxation on its own and that \u201cthis\ntype of thing\u201d has to be regulated on a global level or at least on\na uniform EU level is countered in the white paper as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAttention is\nneeded however to avoid imposing excessive burdens on EU operations\nwhich could compromise the EU role as \u2018global aviation hub\u2019.\nAirport capacity needs to be optimised and (\u2026), increased to face\ngrowing demand for travel.\u201d \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n In actual fact, the\nmajority of all flights by European airlines are domestic flights\nwithin an EU country or flights within Europe (= intra-European\nflights). If European kerosene tax (or adequate charges such as\nkerosene charges) were introduced, foreign airlines would have to pay\nthese taxes (or charges) within the EU as well. You can also safely\nsay that this type of tax, if it were implemented within a large\neconomic bloc such as the EU, would soon be implemented in North\nAmerica and large parts of Asia. If the EU white paper defends the\n\u201cEU as global aviation hub\u201c and does not demand kerosene tax then\nonly because it is pursuing the interests of the major aircraft\nmanufacturers, in this case primarily those of the EADS airbus, and\nthus the tremendous damage to the environment is allowed to continue.\nMoreover, as a result of the financial crisis the EU wishes to pursue\na comparable, special strategy and introduce \u201cfinancial transaction\ntax\u201c, possibly only for the Eurozone, so there is a way \u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n The reference that\nall this is performed because one has to \u201cface growing demand for\ntravel\u201d lacks credibility. This demand does not grow from natural\ncauses, it grows primarily as a result of a policy on the transport\nmarket which has made flying extremely affordable while rail\ntransport has become considerably more expensive. For example, this\ncaused domestic flights in Germany \u2013 flights within the German\nborders \u2013 to increase by 70 percent from 1995 to 2010 while\nlong-distance rail travel during this time frame stagnated, despite\nthe availability of many high-speed rail connections. The reason for\nthis twisted development is mainly due to the fact that flying within\nthis time frame was significantly more economic while the prices for\nlong-distance rail travel increased by a nominal, average 45 percent\nand by more than an effective 25 percent (inflation adjustment).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new white paper\non transport demands: \u201cBy 2050, complete a European high-speed rail\nnetwork\u201c and \u201cTriple the length of the existing high-speed rail\nnetwork by 2030\u201d. (\u2026) By 2050 the ting majority of\nmedium-distance passenger transport should go by rail.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Again, these\nobjectives sound ambitious. Apart from the fact that, for example,\n\u201ctripling the length of the existing high-speed rail network\u201d is\nan illusion and at the same time misleading7<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>,\nthe insignificant truth is that, although there has been an increase\nin high-speed rail networks and an expansion of high-speed transport\nover the past 25 years, the entire length of the rail networks\n(including the high-speed transport networks) has decreased year by\nyear as previously stated. It was not possible to increase the\nproportion of rails for all transport services. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The reason why can\nbe explained in a modified version of famous words once spoken by\nBill Clinton as follows \u201cIt\u2019s the economy of railways, stupid\u201d!\n90 percent of all rail transport takes place in Germany, i.e. in a\nlarge country, in urban transport and transport for distances less\nthan 50 km per trip. If you take into account the transport\nefficiency8<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\ninstead of the amount of traffic per se, a good 50 percent of all\npassenger kilometres in rail transport are still due to the defined\nurban transport. The trend is also even on the increase; the portion\nof urban transport in Germany is on the rise. Even if the entire\nurban transport is not included and only long-distance transport is\ntaken into account \u2013 within Germany this is mainly on trains\nclassified as IC, EC, and ICE and on overnight trains \u2013 the\naverage distance travelled during each long-distance train journey is\naround 250 km. Or to phrase this differently, half of these train\ntrips are for distances less than 250 km and half of them for\ndistances greater than 250 km. This means on the other hand that even\nthe majority of pure long-distance rail travel does not play a\ngreater role, whether the train travels at high-speed or at regular\nspeed. The possible time gains in this range of around 250 km travel\ndistance are relatively low. Also, for the average long-distance\ntraveller, criteria such as punctuality, comfort, seat availability\nand the price of tickets are much more important than the question of\nwhether the train travels at high-speed or at \u201cregular train\nspeed\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With the EU white\npaper on transport once again only mentioning high-speed transport on\ntrains \u2013 as with almost all previous white papers \u2013 and first and\nforemost wishing to develop and promote them the authors are\nfocussing on an absolute minority of clients in rail transport.\nExtensive calculations which include the costs for the infrastructure\nreveal, by the way, that high-speed transport shows a considerably\ngreater deficit than conventional rail transport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU white paper\non transport also demands \u201cwhere possible, connection of all major\nairports to the European high-speed rail network.\u201d This item sound\ngood but is absolutely counter-productive. If there is anything in\nfavour of high-speed transport, it would be the reduction of the\ntravel times between large metropolitan cities, thus a possibility of\nlesser air transport. If, however, additional<\/em>\nstops are made within the region of metropolitan cities and possibly\neven detours are made to \u201cconnect\u201d these airports the times\ngained by travelling at high-speed will be lost. Occasionally, an\nairport itself becomes a railway hub and passengers wishing to travel\nto the metropolitan city or cities have to change trains there.\nHowever, this means that high-speed rail transport would increasingly\nonly serve the purpose of taking passengers to airports,\ninterconnecting the airports and optimising the slots (landing\nrights) for the airlines. This would then mean that high-speed\ntransport would be used to promote air transport and not replace it.\nThis has long been demonstrated in Germany for some intercity\nconnections such as the one from Cologne to Berlin (where air\ntransport is increasing significantly and use of the ICE train has\nstagnated).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2011 EU white\npaper on transport states the \u201cobjective of the EU Commission\u201d is\n\u201cfor the next decade create a genuine Single European Transport\nArea by eliminating all residual barriers between modes and national\nsystems (\u2026) and facilitate the emergence of multinational and\nmultimodal operators.\u201d An extensive \u201cmarket opening\u201d should be\nobtained for the rail sector in particular. This affirms the\ninitiative to \u201cOpen the domestic rail passengers market to\ncompetition, including mandatory award of public service contracts\nunder competitive tendering (\u2026) Ensure effective and\nnon-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure, including\nrail-related services, in particular through structural separation\nbetween infrastructure management and service provision.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The demand to\nseparate network from operation is nothing new for the EU Commission,\nbut in this white paper it is presented in an extremely harsh manner.\nThe background for this is pure ideology or absolute support for\nprivatisation within the rail operation and stripping the uniform\nrail companies the way they still prevail in the whole of Europe\ntoday. The objective of this is definitely not improvement of the\nrail operation. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is demonstrated\nby the two poles within the European\nrail service<\/em> \u2013 Switzerland and the\nUK. Nobody denies that the best rail worldwide is the one in\nSwitzerland; it is also a rail service which costs the tax payer\nconsiderably less per each unit than any other European rail\nservice.9<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\nIt is also an integrated rail service \u2013 the infrastructure and\noperation are both governed by one company, the Swiss rail operator\n(SBB).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The opposite pole is\nrepresented by the rail service in the UK; this was recently assessed\nby the conservative-liberal government who published an extensive\nreport – the McNulty Report. The findings of this report on\nprivatisation of British Rail are as follows: following the\nprivatisation, ticket prices soared tremendously; the British rail\nservices now have the highest rail tariffs within the EU. Government\nsubsidies for the rail system have increased three-fold and the\nefficiency of the rail systems are one third lower than those\ncomparable ones in Europe. The rail systems in the UK are known as a\nperfect example of the stringent separation of rail networks and\noperation, whereby the infrastructure was also privatised between\n1996 and 2001 (with catastrophic consequences); since 2002 the rail\nnetwork has been under government control again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The conclusion made\nby the British government for this disastrous report is in line with\nthe basic approach of this government: jobs shall continue to be cut\nand train stations closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The demands for\n\u201ccompetition\u201c, privatisation and the separation of network from\noperation are unrealistic; on no account do they serve the purpose of\nreaching the objective of an improved rail system. Even in Japan, a\ncountry with a relatively successful privatised rail sector, there\nare different rail companies which all act as integrated<\/em>\ncompanies and on the basis of regional monopolies (whereby the\nmonopoly often relates to an entire island). Moreover, in the 180\nyear history of rail transport there was not one which experienced\nsuccess when the infrastructure and operation were separated. If the\nEU and the new EU white paper make this aspect a central requirement\nit has nothing to do with the objective of improving rail transport.\nRather, it at least condones or tolerates the extensive damage to\nrail transport by additional stripping and segmenting as well as a\ntremendous increase in the required government subsidies for the rail\nsector (from which the competitive transport operators benefit\nindirectly).<\/p>\n\n\n\n With respect to the\nsixth \u201cweb error\u201d in the EU white paper on transport it is stated\nthat:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMobility is vital\nfor the internal market and for the quality of life (\u2026) Transport\nenables economic growth and job creation (\u2026) Curbing mobility is\nnot an option.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The white paper at\nthis point confuses mobility with kilometre efficiency. People do not\nbecome mobile when they have travelled as many kilometres as\npossible; mobility is qualitative \u2013 in accordance with the optimal\nsatisfaction of mobility objectives. This also means that the time\nspent for the mobility service is more regarded as a loss. A policy\non transport which reduces the time spent in traffic\/transport is\nmore a gain in the quality of life. The continuous expansion of\ntransport networks, in particular roads, was until now always\nconnected with an increase in the time spent in traffic\/transport \u2013\nfor example because car cities are linked with urban sprawl and\nfurther distances to travel and because road transport is always\nlinked with traffic jams and a lot of road traffic with even more\ntraffic jam time. I will get back to this later but I wish to\nascertain that the term mobility used in the EU white paper is\nquestionable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The claim that\n\u201cmobility\u201c is linked with the \u201ccreation of jobs\u201c is extremely\nbrief; it actually means that the ruling structure of the transport\nsector is linked with the increase in private vehicle and truck\ntraffic and the tremendously increasing air traffic as well as the\ncreation of jobs. Actually, the number of jobs in the overall\nEuropean automobile industry has been predominantly stable for the\npast 25 years; within the classical automobile manufacturing\ncountries such as Spain, the UK, France and Italy it has even\ndecreased considerably. In Germany it was just possible to keep the\njob number level (800,000). Only in Middle and Eastern Europe the\nnumber of jobs increased significantly after the fall of the Iron\nCurtain. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, in the same\ntime frame there was a reduction of around one million employees in\nthe rail sector and rail industry within the EU-27 region. It is\nnoticeable how unilaterally the issue of \u201cjobs\u201d is addressed and\nhow the term \u201ccreation of jobs\u201d is only addressed when reference\nis made to specific<\/em>\njobs. Jobs in the public sector, for example in rail services, in\npublic urban passenger transport, in public utilities or in training\nand education and the health sector – it is often said \u2013 were able\nto be \u201ccut\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The general finding\nin the EU white paper according to which \u201ccurbing mobility is not\nan option\u201d is questionable. Politics are always linked with\ncurbing; the environment, nature and the laws of physics are linked\nwith curbing. When the volcano Eyafjallay\u00f6kull spit volcanic ash\nthis also resulted in curbing of mobility (while at the same time\nhundreds of thousands of people in the areas surrounding major\nairports breathed a sigh of relief and for the first time in decades\nwere able to enjoy their surroundings and sleep without aircraft\nnoise). Each congestion charge zone is linked with curbing of a\nspecific kind of mobility (while at the same time pedestrians, bike\nriders, children, and handicapped persons this mobility is\nincreased).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The legitimacy of\nclimate change makes it self-evident that there is an urgent\nrequirement for the reduction of motorised transport services \u2013\nwhich in the end could be a prerequisite for the later generation\nbeing able to enjoy a life worth living with mobility as well. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taking into special\naccount the responsibility of the unions and environmental politics,\nthis report or document does not allow for an extensive description\nof an alternative transport model. However the following seven\nelements could outline the structure for a type of alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a necessity\nfor a realistic and responsible estimation of the role played by the\ntransport sector and its significance for human mobility on the one\nhand and on the environment and climate change on the other. \u201cPeak\noil\u201d \u2013 the endlessness of oil and an economic and transport model\nbased on oil and its derivates has to play a central role in this.\n\u201cPeak soil\u201d should be taken into account as well \u2013 i.e. the\nfiniteness of the earth and thus the inner link between a mass usage\nof \u201cagro fuels\u201d and the increase in the cost of food or the\nincrease in world poverty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The top priority for\nthe correct definition of \u201cmobility\u201d is that motorised transport\nshould also be prevented. In goods transport the objective should be\nthe required mass reduction in transport services (by avoiding\nunnecessary transport). The internalisation of external costs (see\nbelow) plays a role, just like specific political decisions and\nrestrictions (e.g. wide-reaching night flights at airports; goods\ntransport should, where possible, be conveyed by rail transport above\na certain distance).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The current\nworldwide, EU and national transport market regulations favour those\nmotorised types of transport which are particularly damaging to the\nenvironment, the change in climate and human health.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kerosene should be\ntaxed just like other fuels and there should be a step-by-step\nintegration of external costs, in particular for road and air\ntransport, in parallel to the creation of alternatives. Speed limits,\nregulations for congestion charge zones, strict parking regulations;\nabolition of tax privileges for company vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The infrastructure\npolicy should be completely reorganised. This could \u2013 as an\nalternative to the \u201cNational Transport Infrastructure Plan\u201d \u2013\nbe integrated into an \u201calternative national transport\ninfrastructure plan\u201d. One of the elements required for this is the\nreconversion of the space which was dedicated to road transport until\nthen in favour of non-motorised transport, and of areas which will\nnow serve their purpose for recreation, culture and leisure\nactivities. There is a new \u201cstructure policy of shorter routes\u201c.\nGenerally speaking, no new roads, and no new airports and runways\nshould be built, while at the same time public transport should be\nsystematically promoted and the rail network expanded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When expanding the\nrail network, focus should be placed on the entire network and the\nunit of urban, regional and long-distance transport, not on\nhigh-speed. The link to this is an integral grid timetable with the\naid of which time can be gained in rail transport mainly through the\nshortened and optimised connections. In succinct terms, a \u201cspeed\nlimit\u201d for rail vehicles (e.g. 200 or 220 km\/h) for a network of\nthis kind would make sense \u2013 especially from the point of view of\nother aspects such as power consumption, noise emission and safety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As previously\ndiscussed, a separation of infrastructure and operation in rail\nsystems is particularly counterproductive. The objective of an\nalternative transport programme should be maintaining or restoring\nthe unit of operation and infrastructure, whereby the prevailing\noperator should be the infrastructure operator if there are several\noperators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Excluding the\nprinciple of maximising profit appears to be particularly important\nfor rail systems and thus a corporate form in public ownership would\nmake sense. However, criticism of the existing rail systems in public\nownership such as DB AG (Germany), SNCF, FS (Italy), RENFE (Spain),\nPKP (Poland), and \u00d6BB (Austria) is largely justified \u2013 and there\nare some good arguments which speak against a \u201creturn to the\nnational rail of the old kind\u201d the way it was before the 90s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is necessary is\na kind of organisation with which public ownership is coupled with a\ncertain autonomy and the tasks for the rail company are clearly\noutlined in a statute (e.g. this also has to include increase in the\nmarket segment for the rails as one of the objectives), decentralised\nforms of public ownership may interface with centralised ones\n(circular rail, regional rail, national rail). The German political\ngroup \u201eDie Linke\u201c recommended to the German government that the\nGerman national rail system (Deutsche Bahn AG) be changed to an\nindependent public-law institution.10<\/sup><\/a><\/sup>\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n The unions in\nGermany developed the term \u201cgood work\u201d some time ago. This makes\nsense because it enables us to get away from the abstract\nglorification according to which \u201cwork as such\u201d \u2013 even horrible\nwork, destructive work, inhuman drudgery \u2013 was a meaningful goal.\nThis refers to the creative contents of work and the sense and\nnonsense of human work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are many areas\nin which \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cmeaningful work\u201d is performed in this\ncontext. It is often work which is hardly perceived by the media in a\nworld dominated by men \u2013 in the household, education, in schools\nand universities, in the public health sector, etc. Of course, this\nalso applies to the sector for environmental technologies and\nalternative energy, etc. where many hundreds of thousands of new and\nsocially useful jobs have been created over the past 15 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or let us take a\nlook at a field which is hardly discussed at all \u2013 that of work for\nbikes and anything to do with bikes. The German government calculated\nthat, in Germany, around 65,000 people work in the production of\nbikes and the bike trade (commerce, repairs, etc.). I add that there\nare more than those who work for the entire German arms industry. It\nis often argued, unfortunately also by the unions, that jobs in the\narms industry have to be defended \u2013 although this is destructive\nwork, \u201ctransport work\u201d, in as far as people are thus transported\nfrom life to death. Jobs concerning bikes were recently never an\nissue which drew the attention of the unions \u2013 although it is \u201cgood\nwork\u201d for useful transport policies (and, by the way, works which\nmakes a positive contribution to health).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Above all, work in\nthe fields of the rail industry and rail networks (rail transport) in\nthis context is \u201cgood work\u201d \u2013 work in a future-proof sector\nwith the objective of a sustainable policy on transport. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this field three\naspects can be combined excellently:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nDetails\non the author:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nWinfried\nWolf has a Ph.D. and is the chief editor of Lunapark 21 \u2013 a\nmagazine for criticism of the global economy. He is actively involved\nwith the rail expert group \u2018Rail for citizens instead of rail for\nthe stock exchange\u2019 (B\u00fcrgerbahn statt B\u00f6rsenbahn). He has written\nthe books \u201cEisenbahn und Autowahn\u201d (Railway and car madness)\n(1985, 1986 and 1992), \u201cVerkehr. Umwelt. Klima \u2013 Die\nGlobalisierung des Tempowahns\u201d (Traffic. environment. climate\nchange – globalisation of speed madness) (2007 and 2009) and \u201cSieben\nKrisen \u2013 ein Crash (Seven crises \u2013 a crash) (Vienna 2009).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \nHe\nwas a member of parliament for the PDS from 1994 to 2002 and the\nspeaker on transport policies for this party in German parliament. He\nworks as a research fellow in the office of the member of parliament\nSabine Leidig, the speaker on transport policies for the political\nparty \u2018die Linke\u2019 in German parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1<\/a>\n\tThe text is based on two speeches held by the author on the topic of\n\tthe EU White Paper 2011 on 9 November 2011 in Bautzen for the Branch\n\tCommittee for the Rail Industry of the Unions (IG Metall) and on 30\n\tNovember 2011 in Brussels for the European Metal Worker\u2019s\n\tFederation (EMF) \u2013 1st workshop of the EMF train project. The\n\tquotations from the White Paper follow the German text; in the case\n\tof the White Paper on Traffic 2011 this is the EU document\n\t\u201cCOM(2011) 144 final\u201c (Brussels, 29 March 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2<\/a>\n\tThe green papers were published under the auspices of the respective\n\tcommission for environment. With a view to environmental politics\n\tthey were usually more advanced than the EU white papers on\n\ttransport. The white papers on transport were prepared under the\n\tauspices of the respective EU commission for transport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3<\/a>\n\tPlease see Winfried Wolf, The European Union Traffic Policy, 2004.\n\tThe \u2013 unpublished \u2013 study was prepared during a research\n\tassignment for the Berlin Social Science Research Center (WZB) and\n\tthe Hans B\u00f6ckler Foundation of the German Trade Union Association\n\t(DGB). \n\t<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4<\/a>\n\tThe study \u201cExternal costs of transport\u201c was prepared by the\n\tinstitutes INFRAS in Bern and IWW in Karlsruhe; it was first\n\tprepared in 1994 and updated in 2000 and 2004. Authors: Christoph\n\tSchreyer (INFRAS), Christian Schneider (INFRAS), Werner Rothengatter\n\tIWW), Claus Doll \/IWW) and David Schmedding (IWW). The exact\n\tgeographic basis was in reference to a structure named \u201cEUR-17\u201c;\n\tthis was the former EU with 15 member states and the non-EU\n\tcountries Switzerland and Norway at that time. Due to international\n\ttransportation the \u201cislands\u201d Switzerland and Norway were\n\tincluded in the study.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5<\/a>\n\tTEN = Trans European Networks; major transport projects within the\n\tEU. These include the Scanlink connections from Denmark to Sweden,\n\tthe Fehmarnbelt connection between Germany and Denmark; the Brenner\n\tbasis tunnel, the high-speed network from Turin to Lyon (Val di\n\tSusa), Stuttgart 21 and the new railway network from Wendlingen to\n\tUlm; high-speed networks on normal gauge tracks on the Iberian\n\tpeninsula such as Madrid to Barcelona, Madrid to Seville, Madrid to\n\tLisbon. \n\t<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6<\/a>\n\tCongestion costs are costs which usually only occur in road\n\ttransport because this type of transport causes huge traffic jams\n\tdue to its anarchic organisation (\u201ceveryone travels on his\/her\n\town\u201c), while air and rail transport is organised according to\n\tschedule and the capacities available. Consequently, recording\n\tso-called congestion costs as \u201cexternal costs\u201c as stated in\n\tseveral EU green and white papers on transport has to give a\n\tdistorted image. It is a well-known fact that roads produce road\n\ttraffic and traffic jams and that Los Angeles, as the one region\n\twith the densest motorway network in the world, has the greatest\n\tnumber of traffic jams. \n\t<\/p>\n\n\n\n 7<\/a>\n\tIn France and Germany expansion of a high-speed network took place\n\tin parallel to the reduction of the overall network. Often\n\thigh-speed networks simply replace existing networks for\n\tconventional train transport. The phrase \u201ccompletion of a\n\thigh-speed network\u201d suggests that something\n\tadditional<\/em> will be built to\n\tcomplement the classical network<\/em>. This\n\tonly applies to a small portion of the new high-speed networks. \n\t<\/p>\n\n\n\n 8<\/a>\n\tAmount of traffic = number of all journeys made; traffic efficiency\n\t= number of journeys made multiplied by the kilometres driven (=\n\t\u201cpassenger kilometres\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 9<\/a>\n\tAccording to PRIMON reports prepared by Booz Allen Hamilton \u201cthe\n\taverage annual government subsidies in EURO cents per unit of\n\tkilometre for rail systems (Ptkm) during the time frame 1995 to\n\t2003\u201d were: Switzerland 2.4 cents, Sweden 4.0, UK 5.3, France 6.2,\n\tAustria 6.6, Germany 7.0, Denmark 6.7, The Netherlands 9.2 and Italy\n\t9.4 cents. This means that the somewhat miserable range of rail\n\ttransport in Austria or Germany costs the taxpayer per unit of\n\tservice almost three times as much as it costs the Swiss taxpayer\n\tfor the almost luxurious range of rail transport available in\n\this\/her country. These reports (PRIMON = Privatisation with and\n\twithout networks\u201c) were prepared by persons who are focussed on\n\tprivatising the German railway system (Deutsche Bahn AG). Some\n\toptions for privatising the German rail system \u2013 with and without\n\tnetworks, Booz Allen Hamilton, January 2006, p. 77 (the version for\n\tmembers of the German parliament). The unit Ptkm is a \u2013 meaningful\n\t\u2013 artificial size which totals the passenger kilometres (Ptkm) and\n\tthe tonne-kilometres (tkm) and thus forms one uniform unit of\n\tservice which relates to the state subsidies. When translated this\n\tmeans: in order to enable services for a passenger kilometre and a\n\ttonne-kilometre, Swiss taxpayers have to pay 2.4 cents, etc. \n\t<\/p>\n\n\n\n